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Spurious Legislation and Spurious
Mandamus in Florida
ERNEST E. MEANS*
The Florida Supreme Court has, in a number of recent
cases, issued peremptory writs of mandamus directing the sec-
retary of state to expunge designated wording from the official
legislative record, of which he is the constitutional custodian.
The author argues that these holdings constitute a clear abuse
of this extraordinary writ, most recently as a mere pretext for
bringing a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute
within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. The au-
thor also proposes a conceptual framework for dealing with a
material variation in wording between a bill as enacted by the
legislature and the same bill as it is signed into law by the
governor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone,' the Circuit
Court for the Second Judicial Circuit issued the following order:
This cause now being before me pursuant to this Court's
alternative writ of mandamus ....
It is ordered and adjudged that the Respondent, George
Firestone, Secretary of State, strike the following language from
the laws of Florida as it appears [in] the enrolled CS for SB 348:
Each application for approval of the establishment and
maintenance of a branch office shall state the proposed
location thereof, the need therefor, the functions to be
performed therein, the estimated volume of business
thereof, the estimated annual expense thereof, and the
mode of payment therefor. Each such application shall
be accompanied by a budget of the association for the
current earnings period and for the next succeeding
semi-annual period, which reflects the estimated addi-
tional expense of the maintenance of such a branch
office.'
On its face, this order raises disturbing questions. For one, it
would seem that the implication of such an order in mandamus is
that the secretary of state actually possesses authority, in appro-
priate circumstances, to expunge language from an enrolled act of
the legislature that is in his custody. For another, if the secretary
of state does not have such authority, and surely he does not, was
it not an abuse of the writ of mandamus for the court to issue such
an order? And was it not also an abuse of this so-called extraordi-
nary writ for the court to order performance of an act that could
not possibly benefit the relator attorney general, or anyone else, in
any meaningful way? Finally, and incidentally, what must be the
constitutional status of an act of the legislature, whatever its sub-
1. No. 80-2354 (2d Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1980).
2. Id., slip op. at 1.
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ject matter, that could be the object of such an order? These ques-
tions will be explored following this chronology of the relevant
events leading to the peremptory writ quoted above.
April 8, 1980: As a consequence of regular "sunset" review,$
chapter 665 of the Florida Statutes,' which regulates savings and
loan associations, would have expired automatically on July 1,
1980.5 On April 8, 1980, Senate bill 348, revising chapter 665,
was introduced. On the same date a committee substitute for
Senate bill 348' was moved to final passage and certified to the
House."
May 28, 1980: The House passed Committee Substitute for
Senate bill 348 with two amendments.' Amendment 1 amended
"all after the enacting clause," thereby effectively substituting
an entirely different bill.10 Amendment 2 substituted a new
title."
June 6, 1980: The Senate adopted seven amendments to
House amendment 1, and one amendment to House amendment
2.12
June 6, 1980: The House concurred in Senate amendments
5 through 7 to House amendment 1, and in Senate amendment 1
to House amendment 2. The House refused, however, to concur
in Senate amendments 1 through 4 to House amendment 1, and
requested the Senate to recede therefrom. 18
June 6, 1980: The Senate obliged, ordering the bill to be
certified back to the House without Senate amendments 1
through 4 to House amendment 1,11 and to be engrossed" and
enrolled."
3. The Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1979), now known as the
Regulatory Sunset Act, FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1981), provides for the systematic review of spec-
ified governmental licensing and regulatory functions and mandates specific dates of auto-
matic repeal.
4. Florida Savings Association Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 665 (1979).
5. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-457, § 1 (amending 1976 Fla. Laws 76-168, secs. 3-4).
6. FLA. S. JOUR., 1980 Reg. Sees. at 39.
7. Id. at 65.
8. Id. at 65-66.
9. FLA. H.R. JouR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 712-42.
10. Id. at 713-41.
11. Id. at 741-42.
12. FLA. S. JouR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 959.
13. FLA. H.R. JOUR., 1980 Reg. Seas. at 1296-98.
14. FLA. S. JouR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 1010.
15. Engrossment is a procedure by which a revised copy of a bill is prepared, clearly
showing approved amendments. A. CoIGNE, STATUTE MAKING, A TReATISE ON THE MEANS
AND METHODS FOR THE ENACTMENT OF STATUTE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (1948); H.
WALKER, LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 361-63 (1934).
16. An enrolled bill is one which appears in final engrossed form on the sheet which is
1982)
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June 30, 1980: The Governor approved the enrolled copy of
Committee Substitute for Senate bill 348, and it thereby became
a law."
August 8, 1980: Sometime prior to August 8, 1980, but sub-
sequent to the Governor's approval of Committee Substitute for
Senate bill 348, the Senate leadership discovered that Senate
amendments 1 through 4 to House amendment 1, from which
the Senate had receded at the request of the House, had been
erroneously engrossed into the bill prior to its enrollment and
presentation to the Governor. Thus, the bill signed by the Gov-
ernor did not contain language that the erroneously engrossed
Senate amendments 1 through 4 had deleted," and contained
language that the erroneously engrossed Senate amendment 4
had added.'"
August 8, 1980: The President of the Senate informed the
Secretary of State of the erroneous engrossment of Senate
amendment 4 into Committee Substitute for Senate bill 348 and
requested that the Secretary of State expunge from the enrolled
bill specified wording that had been added by the erroneous en-
grossment.3 0 There was no mention of the erroneous engross-
ment of amendments 1 through 3, nor of the language that
amendment 4 had deleted.
August 11, 1980: By letter, the Secretary of State responded
that he agreed as to the spurious character of the wording
sought to be expunged, but denied that, as custodian of the
laws, he had any authority to comply with the request.
August 12, 1980: The Attorney General of Florida filed a
Petition for an Alternative Writ of Mandamus in the Circuit
Court for the Second Judicial Circuit to require the Secretary of
State to expunge from the enrolled act the wording added by
Senate amendment 4 to House amendment 1.31 The Attorney
General did not request the addition to the enrolled act of the
language that was deleted by the erroneous engrossment into
to become the permanent copy of the act. After the enrolled bill has been signed by the
governor, it is published in the Laws of Florida. See A. COIGNE, supra note 15, 209; H.
WALKER, supra note 15, at 368-69.
17. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-257 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 665 (Supp. 1980)).
18. FLA. S. JOUR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 959.
19. FLA. S. JoUR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 959; see infra notes 188-189.
20. Letter from Philip D. Lewis to George Firestone (Aug. 11, 1980). The enrolled bill
for Committee Substitute for Senate bill 348 was in the possession of the Secretary of State
pursuant to his constitutional duty to "keep the records of the official acts of the legislative
and executive departments." FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 4(b).
21. Petition for an Alternative Writ of Mandamus, State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone, No.
80-2354 (2d Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1980). The petition did not mention the Senate leadership, for
whom the Attorney General was obviously acting.
[Vol. 37:1
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the bill of Senate amendments 1 through 4.
August 14, 1980: By a Motion to Expedite, the Attorney
General informed the circuit court that copy for the 1980 Flor-
ida Statutes had to be in the hands of the printer by September
15, 1980, and that "a prompt disposition of this cause will allow
submission to the printer of the proper text of Chapter 80-257,
Laws of Florida."2
August 27, 1980: In his Response to the Petition, the Secre-
tary of State stated that he had no independent information
concerning Committee Substitute for Senate bill 348 that would
justify his complying with the Petition."8
September 5, 1980: The court issued the Peremptory Writ
of Mandamus quoted above. Neither party sought appellate
review.
II. MANDAMUS TO EXPUNGE WORDING FROM THE LEGISLATIVE
RECORD
The writ of mandamus has been aptly characterized as "a
remedy for official inaction.' 4 Mandamus, which had its origin in
the prerogative power of the English sovereign, 5
is used to compel a lower court, public officer, public corpora-
tion, governmental entity, private corporation or corporate of-
ficer to perform a duty involving a ministerial act that the party
has a duty to perform. The writ cannot be used where the party
has discretion to act, and it cannot be used unless there is no
other adequate remedy.' s
Under Florida law, the following elements are commonly un-
derstood to be the prerequisites for issuance of the writ of
mandamus:
1. The law must clearly impose on the respondent an official
duty to perform some act.
2. The respondent must have failed or refused to perform
that act.
3. The act sought to be compelled by the writ must be min-
isterial, not requiring the exercise of any discretion.
22. Motion to Expedite at 1, Firestone.
23. Response to Petition for an Alternative Writ of Mandamus, Firestone.
24. Goodrich & Cone, Mandamus in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 535 (1951)(citing City of
Atlanta v. Wright, 119 Ga. 207, 211, 45 S.E. 994, 995 (1903)).
25. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 620-21 (1838); 52 AM.
Jun. 2D Mandamus §§ 2, 6 (1970).
26. J. LrrrIL, EQUITABLE' AND EXTRAORDINARY REMiEDS, THE LAW IN FLORIDA § 4-2
(1980).
1982]
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4. The party seeking the writ must have a clear legal right
to compel performance of the act.
5. The petitioner must have no other adequate or specific
remedy.2 7
In addition, the writ may not be issued when its issuance would be
unavailing to the petitioner.2 Issuance of a peremptory writ in the
face of the obvious absence of one or more of these prerequisites
constitutes an abuse of the writ of mandamus.
The issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the secretary of
state to expunge specified wording from the official legislative re-
cord in his custody does not meet the traditional prerequisites for
the issuance of that writ. Of these prerequisites, the respondent's
authority to perform the action sought to be enforced is of special
importance. After all, without such authority, the respondent can-
not have a duty to the petitioner or anyone else. Without such au-
thority and duty in the respondent, the petitioner has no legal
right to such performance. And there can hardly be any such duty
or right, or judicial enforcement thereof, unless the action sought
to be enforced is essentially nondiscretionary.
A. Authority of the Secretary of State
A preexisting authority in the respondent is a critically impor-
tant and generally acknowledged prerequisite for the issuance of a
peremptory writ of mandamus. Thus, the circuit court's order in
Firestone to the Secretary of State to expunge wording from an
enrolled act in his official custody is judicial affirmation that the
secretary of state actually possesses such authority.2" Whether the
27. TRIBBLE, Mandamus, in EXTRAORDINARY WRITS IN FLORIDA § 2.4 (1979) (citations
omitted). For examples of element (1), see State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312
(Fla. 1961); State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508 (Fla.
1933). For an example of element (2), see County Comm'rs v. State, 24 Fla. 263, 4 So. 795
(1888). For examples of element (3), see City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel's, Inc., 351 So.
2d 719 (Fla. 1977); City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Epicure, Inc., 148 Fla. 255, 4 So. 2d
116 (1941). For an example of element (4), see State ex rel. Kersey v. Jinkins, 152 Fla. 113,
10 So. 2d 914 (1942). For examples of element (5), see Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976); City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Worley, 44 So. 2d 298
(Fla. 1950).
28. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ostroff v. Pearson, 61 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1952); State ex rel.
Bisbee v. Inspectors of Elections, 17 Fla. 26 (1878).
29. The Supreme Court of Alabama expressly recognized that this very implication
would result from its issuance of such a writ in State ex rel. Brickman v. Wilson, 123 Ala.
259, 26 So. 482 (1899). At issue was the authority of the Secretary of State of Alabama to
expunge matter from the legislative journals, which were in his official custody. The court
stated that they could so order the secretary of state only
[Vol. 37:1
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Florida secretary of state possesses this authority to expunge mat-
ter from the legislative record is not a matter that can be pursued
on a case-by-case basis. If this authority exists, there must be some
source to which it can be attributed.
The Florida Constitution provides only that "[tihe secretary
of state shall keep the records of the official acts of the legislative
and executive departments." 0 Various statutory provisions con-
firm this role of the secretary 1 and the Department of State s as
custodians of the official records of the legislative branch of gov-
ernment. None of these constitutional or statutory provisions even
hint, however, that the secretary or the Department is in any man-
ner responsible for the content of the official records in their cus-
tody. Surely the power to alter cannot be implied from the mere
power of custody."3 It can only be concluded, therefore, that Flor-
after determining that it was the secretary of state's duty, in the absence of all
action by any court, to have so determined, [that the legislative journal con-
tained unauthorized material] and thereupon proceeded to erase the alleged for-
eign matter; and the court cannot so adjudge in this instance without confirming
for all time the power and duty of that officer to pass upon what these records
contain, and to expunge all that he finds in them which he thinks does not be-
long theie.
Id. at 285-86, 26 So. at 489.
30. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(b); see also Id. art. XI, §§ 2(c), 3, 4 (providing for filing
with the secretary of state proposals for constitutional amendments, initiative petitions and
revision proposals).
31. As head of the Department of State, the secretary of state has authority to "execute
the powers, duties, and functions vested in that department." FLA. STAT. § 20.05(1)(a)
(1981).
32. "The Department of State shall have the custody of... the resolutions of the Leg-
islature. . . ." Id. § 15.01. "The Department of State shall have custody. . . of the laws of
the state and books, papers, journals and documents of the Legislature." Id. § 15.02.
All original acts and resolutions passed by the Legislature, and all other original
papers acted upon thereby, together with the Journal of the Senate, and the
Journal of the House of Representatives, shall, immediately upon the adjourn-
ment thereof, be deposited with, and preserved in, the Department of State, by
which they shall be properly arranged, classified, and filed ....
Id. § 15.07.
33. This notion was discussed by the Alabama Supreme Court, which said:
Let the phrase "to keep" be given its broadest meaning . . . yet it falls short of
imposing upon the secretary of state the duty, or conferring on him the right, to
strike from this record any writing, purporting to be part of it, that may at any
time appear upon it ....
State ex rel. Brickman v. Wilson, 123 Ala. 259, 284, 26 So. 482, 489 (1899).
The Alabama Supreme Court so construed the phrase "to keep" because:
A duty which puts it in the power of a ministerial officer, without adversary
proceedings, without notice to anybody, without record of his acts, and without
his proceedings being subject to review, to change, amend, and destroy public
records of the most vital importance to the state and to its citizens, cannot be
implied from the imposition upon him of the duty to safely keep and preserve
19821
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ida's secretary of state is without constitutional or statutory au-
thority to expunge wording from an enrolled act that is in his offi-
cial custody.
B. The Spurious Legislation Cases
1. GWYNN V. HARDEE
In State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone, the petitioner attorney
general cited Gwynn v. Hardee4 and State ex rel. Watson v.
Gray" as precedents for the court's authority to order expunge-
ment of wording from an act of the legislature. Like Firestone,
Hardee involved a statute containing spurious wording. Hardee,
however, was a proceeding for a temporary injunction, not a writ of
mandamus, and therefore was not a valid precedent for the court's
action in Firestone. Furthermore, the court in Hardee did not spe-
cifically address the question of physical removal of the spurious
wording from the statute. Although the court's opinion in Hardee
did contain some phrases vaguely suggesting actual expungement
of the spurious language,3 O there are other phrases which indicated
that actual deletion was not intended.3 7 In any event, the court did
not expressly order anyone to expunge wording from the statute.38
2. STATE EX REL. WATSON V. GRAY
State ex rel. Watson v. Gray,"9 the second case cited as prece-
dent to the circuit court in Firestone, did, however, provide appar-
ent precedent for a court-ordered expunction of statutory wording.
Watson, like Firestone, was an original action in mandamus,
brought by the attorney general to require the secretary of state, as
custodian of the official records of the legislature, to expunge cer-
tain spurious language from an enrolled act that was in his
custody.
those records. A power to thus destroy, even with the honest intent to preserve,
cannot be implied from a duty to keep, guard, and protect.
Id. at 286, 26 So. at 490.
34. 92 Fla. 543, 110 So. 343 (1926).
35. 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d 721 (1943).
36. The court described the spurious provision as "eliminated and stricken." 92 Fla. at
559, 110 So. at 348.
37. The court referred to the spurious wording as being merely "void and ineffective."
Id. at 555, 110 So. at 347.
38. For a discussion of the Gwynn court's treatment of the statutory infirmity consist-
ing of spurious wording, see infra text accompanying notes 167-72.
39. 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d 721 (1943).
[Vol. 37:1
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During the 1943 legislative session, Senate bill 240, relating to
easements on lands subjected to tax sale, passed the Senate and
was certified to the House.40 The House passed the bill with three
amendments.4' The Senate concurred in House amendments 1 and
2, but requested the House to recede from amendment 3, which
would have added a statement of legislative intent to the bill.42
The House complied with this request and receded from amend-
ment 3.43 Through a clerical error, however, House amendment 3
to Senate bill 240, which had been rejected by both houses, was
nevertheless engrossed into the bill along with amendments 1 and
2, and included in the enrolled bill that was presented for the gov-
ernor's approval. The governor signed the bill into law.
In the Petition for Mandamus, the Attorney General pointed
out that the erroneously engrossed bill was in the custody of the
Secretary of State, who would shortly publish the incorrect form of
the bill unless commanded by the court to expunge the erroneously
included wording. The consequence, he warned, would be "a most
confusing situation," not only for the relator, but also for the
bench and bar and the general public." Mandamus, he urged, was
the only adequate remedy.4
In his Return to the Alternative Writ, the Secretary of State
acknowledged the facts presented in the petition. The Secretary
explained that he had nevertheless declined to expunge the spuri-
ous matter because the bill, which had been filed in his office after
its approval by the Governor, imported verity as an official act of
the legislature. He stated that "he would not be justified in making
any change therein or deleting any language therefrom unless di-
rected to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.''47
40. FLA. S. JOUR., 1943 Reg. Sess. at 121.
41. FLA. H.R. JouR., 1943 Reg. Sess. at 388-89.
42. FLA. S. JoUR., 1943 Reg. Sess. at 319. Amendment 3 would have added the following
language: "This act shall apply only if and when the owner or owners of such easement has
paid such tax or taxes on such easement, it being the intent of this Act that taxes on such
easement be paid only once in each year to each applicable taxing authority." FLA. S.B. 240,
1943 Reg. Sess., amend. No. 3, FLA. H.R. JOUR., 1943 Reg. Sess. at 389.
43. FLA. H.R. JOUR., 1943 Reg. Sess. at 513.
44. 1943 Fla. Laws ch. 21805.
45. Petition for Mandamus at 5-6, State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d
721 (1943).
46. Petition for Mandamus at 1, Watson. The attorney general did not explain why he
had not resorted to the new remedy of declaratory judgment, which had been created by the
recent legislative session. 1943 Fla. Laws ch. 21820 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§
86.011-.111 (1981)). Perhaps he doubted that the necessary expungement of the spurious
language could be accomplished by that procedure.
47. Return of Respondent to Alternative Writ of Mandamus at 1, Watson.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Justice Terrell, writing for the majority, was rather selective,
however, in his response to the Secretary's return, referring only to
the statement that the enrolled bill imported verity as an official
act of the legislature.' Entirely omitted was any mention of the
Secretary's statement that he "would not be justified in making
any changes"-in other words, that he lacked authority to do so.
The verity issue was easily resolved. Because Florida is a so-called
"journal entry" state,' 9 an enrolled bill's presumption of validity is
not absolute and can be overcome through resort to the legislative
journals.5 0 Having concluded that the legislative journals did in-
deed show that the enrolled bill contained provisions that had not
been approved by both houses of the legislature, the majority held
the subject language to be "spurious and illegal" and issued the
peremptory writ ordering its expungement from the statute by the
Secretary of State."1 By focusing on a single issue, Justice Terrell
was able to avoid even mentioning the question for which he had
no answer-whether the secretary of state possessed the preexis-
tent authority that is normally a prerequisite for mandamus.
Absence of any discussion of the secretary's authority is the
more notable since the justices obviously discussed the issue in
conference. Justice Brown, who was joined in his dissent by Jus-
tices Thomas and Sebring, agreed with the majority that House
amendment 3 should not have been engrossed into the bill because
it had not been enacted by the legislature. He dissented, however,
because mandamus lies only to compel the performance of a clear
legal duty, and because he knew "of no constitutional or statutory
provision giving the Secretary of State the authority to strike from
any bill or act of the legislature any part thereof." 2
The majority opinion properly cited the earlier cases of
Gwynn v. Hardee" and State ex rel. Cunningham v. Davis5" as
precedents for the proposition that an enrolled bill's presumption
of authenticity may be overcome through resort to the legislative
journals.55 Then, however, by a reference citation to "the last cited
cases," the majority opinion again cited the same cases as prece-
dent for the court's authority to order expunction of the spurious
48. 153 Fla. at 463-64, 14 So. 2d at 721.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 134-36.
50. 153 Fla. at 464, 14 So. 2d at 721.
51. Id. at 464, 14 So. 2d at 722.
52. Id. at 464, 14 So. 2d at 722 (Brown, J., dissenting).
53. 92 Fla. 543, 110 So. 343 (1926).
54. 123 Fla. 41, 166 So. 289 (1936).
55. 153 Fla. at 464, 14 So. 2d at 721-22.
[Vol. 37:1
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language by the secretary of state." Neither case, however, consti-
tuted a valid precedent for such authority. It has already been
noted that the Gwynn court obviously did not have physical ex-
punction of language in mind. Although the Cunningham case
was also an original action in mandamus in the supreme court, the
petitioner there was attempting to compel the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives to expunge
certain allegedly false entries from the journals of their respective
houses. Since those legislative officers did have a duty to record a
true account of the activities of their respective houses, it is cer-
tainly arguable that they had the requisite preexisting authority to
perform the act commanded by the writ.58 This was certainly no
precedent for a court order requiring expungement of statutory
wording. 9
C. Dickinson v. Stone
The Florida Supreme Court next ordered the expunction of
statutory language in the 1971 case of Dickinson v. Stone.60 This
was also an original action in mandamus, brought by the state
Comptroller to require the Secretary of State to expunge certain
proviso language from the 1971 General Appropriations Act. 1 As
part of a continuing program for the centralization of control over
the data processing centers serving the various state agencies, 2 the
legislature directed the transfer of the "complete control and su-
pervision" of, among others, the Carlton Data Center from the of-
fice of the Comptroller to the Data Processing Division of the Gen-
eral Services Department."3 The Carlton Data Center served the
56. Id. at 464, 14 So. 2d at 722.
57. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
58. See Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla. 816, 156 So. 274 (1934).
59. Actually, the spurious wording was never physically expunged from the enrolled act.
It was, however, omitted from the text of chapter 21805, as published in the 1943 Laws of
Florida, with a footnote setting out the deleted wording and citing to the opinion of the
supreme court. 1943 Fla. Laws ch. 21805.
60. 251 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1971).
61. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-357, § 2.
62. FLA. STAT. § 23.027(2) (1981).
63. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-357, § 2. That part of the statute to which the comptroller
objected read as follows:
It is the intent of the legislature that the electronic data processing division
of the department of general services shall assume complete control and supervi-
sion of the designated data centers in this section, including accounting,
purchasing, personnel and other administrative services for the purpose of pro-
viding adequate data processing services to the various users of these centers.
Further, the electronic data processing division of the department of general ser-
1982]
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Comptroller and the Department of Banking and Finance, of
which the Comptroller was department head. In his petition for
mandamus, the Comptroller argued that the effect of the transfer
would be "to transfer to the Department of General Services the
supervision and control of the personnel and data processing
equipment which are vital and absolutely necessary to the comp-
troller for the complete exercise of his official constitutional duties
of. . .settling and approving accounts against the state .... "'
The Florida Supreme Court stated that although it normally
preferred that the constitutionality of a statute be considered first
by a trial court, it would nevertheless accept original jurisdiction of
the matter on the ground that it involved "a provision of the Gen-
eral Appropriations Act of 1971 so that the functions of govern-
ment will be adversely affected unless an immediate determination
is made by this Court."" Noting simply that a state officer was
named as respondent and that the Comptroller was entitled to
question the validity of this portion of the statute, the court de-
nied the motion to quash.6 There was no citation of precedent in
support of the court's jurisdiction.
Having accepted jurisdiction based on the Comptroller's alle-
gation that the proviso would prevent him from fulfilling his "offi-
cial constitutional duties," the court then abandoned that rationale
as justification for holding the statute invalid and issuing the per-
emptory writ. Instead, the court relied on an entirely different
ground, one that the Comptroller had not even mentioned. In an
opinion by Justice Adkins, the court held that enactment of the
transfer of the data center as part of the General Appropriations
Act offended article III, section 12 of the Florida Constitution,
which provides: "Laws making appropriations for salaries of public
officers and other current expenses of the state shall contain provi-
sions on no other subject. ' '67 The court reasoned that the transfer
vices is directed to provide programming and coordination, to the end that all
centers function efficiently and economically and render all possible service to
the state departments and agencies serviced.
Id. Carlton Data Center was one of the designated data centers.
64. 251 So.2d at 271. The comptroller's duties are stated in article IV, section 4(d) of
the Florida Constitution.
65. 251 So. 2d at 271.
66. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2); FLA. R. App. P. 4.5(b); 21 FLA. JUR. Mandamus
§ 51 (1958).
67. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 12. In his Reply Brief, petitioner noted that the question of
conflict with article 11, section 12 had been "thoroughly discussed and argued at the oral
argument by both the Petitioners and Respondents." Reply Brief at 5, Dickinson, 251 So.
2d at 268. The fact that argument occurred despite total absence of any mention of this
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of the data center from one department of state government to an-
other "was not so relevant to, interwoven with, and interdependent
upon the appropriation of funds for the operation of the Carlton
Data Center so [sic] as to justify under the constitutional provision
its inclusion within the General Appropriations Act."" It there-
upon directed issuance of a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, order-
ing the Secretary of State to expunge the offending paragraph
from the act,69 and directed that the appropriation for the Carlton
Data Center be considered part of the budget of the Comptroller
instead of the Department of General Services." The court cited
no precedent for the action taken.7'
question in the petition for mandamus or the supporting brief certainly suggests that this
was basically a very friendly action. See Petition for Mandamus, Dickinson, 251 So. 2d at
268; Reply Brief, Dickinson, 251 So. 2d at 268.
68. 251 So. 2d at 274 (citation omitted). The court also held that, in failing to mention
the attempted transfer, the title of the act was defective under article III, section 6 of the
Florida Constitution, which reads: "Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter
properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."
69. 251 So. 2d at 274. The lack of seriousness with which the court issued the peremp-
tory writ is revealed by the way it is addressed. The order to expunge wording from an act
of the legislature is addressed not only to the Secretary of State-the only official capable of
performance-but also to Chester Blakemore, as executive director of the Department of
General Services, and to the Department of General Services, consisting of the governor and
cabinet, with all of the members listed. Peremptory Writ at 1, Dickinson, 251 So. 2d at 268.
70. 251 So. 2d at 274.
71. Although the Dickinson majority offered no precedents in support of the action
that it took, there were cases that could have been cited which arguably support both the
court's resort to mandamus in order to make an immediate determination of an important
public question, and the court's order requiring expungement of wording from a statute. It
is possible, however, that these precedents were left unmentioned precisely because they
would have emphasized the incongruity of the court's action in the context of this case. For
example, in both State ex rel. Ayres v. Gray, 69 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1953) and State ex rel.
West v. Gray, 70 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1954), the court responded to petitions in mandamus to
require the Secretary of State to expunge certain matters from the election records. The
expungement would have been ordered from records that the Secretary of State was respon-
sible for compiling. Although whether or not this duty was ministerial is questionable, it was
at least arguable that the Secretary had authority to perform the act which may have been
ordered. In Dickinson, however, the Secretary had no such authority.
The Dickinson majority could also have cited State ex rel. Watson v. Gray as prece-
dent, albeit a weak one, for its order requiring the Secretary to expunge wording from an act
of the legislature. Citing to Watson, however, would also have emphasized the incongruity of
the instant holding. In Watson, the wording ordered expunged was demonstrably spurious,
never having become law because never approved by the legislature. See supra text accom-
panying note 44. The wording ordered expunged in Dickinson, however, was not only law,
but also accurately expressed the intent of the legislature. It had simply been held unconsti-
tutional and therefore unenforceable. There was certainly no precedent for expunging word-
ing simply because it was unconstitutional. Indeed, statutory provisions that have been held
unconstitutional may later be held to be constitutional. See, e.g., School Bd. of Broward
County v. Price, 362 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1978).
In drawing the foregoing distinction between expunction of spurious wording and ex-
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Justice Ervin, dissenting, questioned whether the "mechanical
or ministerial work of electronic data processing for the state and
all its agencies" improperly and unduly impinged upon the consti-
tutional duties of the comptroller and whether the quoted para-
graph was really so substantive as to be out of place in the General
Appropriations Act. 2 More important for the present discussion,
however, he questioned the appropriateness of the court's order to
expunge matter from the statute, saying:
Lastly, I am particularly dismayed by the Court arrogating
to itself a prime function of the Legislature by ordering the Sec-
retary of State to expunge the language under attack followed
by the Court transferring part of an appropriation of state funds
from one state department to another. Even the Governor has to
veto an appropriation item as a whole including the language
accompanying it.
Here we do not content ourselves with holding the language
under attack unconstitutional and either invalidating the lan-
guage itself or the item as well, but we take over the legislative
function to complete what in our wisdom we think ought to have
been done by rewriting the item as a whole by expungement and
by transferring the lump sum appropriation made to one depart-
ment to another.7"
The majority did not respond to Justice Ervin's challenge to the
court's authority to order expungement of wording from the
statute.
In Dickinson, the Florida Supreme Court violated virtually
every requirement for issuance of the writ of mandamus. 4 It or-
punction of unconstitutional wording, the writer does not wish to be understood as condon-
ing either. The requisite preexisting authority in the secretary of state is equally lacking in
both situations.
72. 251 So. 2d at 276 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 279-80. Justice Ervin's objection to the expungement order was weakened
considerably by his combining it with his protest concerning the transfer of the appropri-
ated funds to the comptroller. Assuming the correctness of the court's holding that the at-
tempted transfer was invalid as a part of the General Appropriations Act, one can hardly
question the court's authority to redirect the appropriation to the agency that was to ad-
minister the activity being funded.
74. The court's holding also violated one of its own appellate rules. The Florida Appel-
late Rules in effect at the time of the court's opinion in Dickinson provided that an applica-
tion for any of the extraordinary writs "will not be entertained by the Court" when it
.,raises questions of fact that will require the taking of testimony." FLA. R. APP. P. 45a(2).
The Comptroller's assertion that the offending proviso transferred supervision and control
of the data center that was "vital and absolutely necessary to the Comptroller in the exer-
cise of his constitutional duties," 251 So. 2d at 271, was sufficiently complex and doubtful
that the petition should have been denied under the rule. In his dissent, Justice Ervin char-
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dered performance of an action that was clearly outside the au-
thority of the respondent Secretary of State, and to which, conse-
quently, the petitioner Comptroller could not have had the
necessary preexisting "clear legal right. 75 Additionally, the court
accepted jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the stat-
ute on the basis urged by the petitioner, but then switched to an
entirely different ground, one not mentioned by the petition for
mandamus, as the basis for issuing the peremptory writ.76 Actually,
the statute did not qualify upon either of these grounds for such a
challenge by mandamus. Normally, challenges to the constitution-
ality of statutes arise in mandamus proceedings in one of two ways:
(1) [b]y the claim of the relator that a statute which, if
valid, would excuse the respondent from performing the act or
duty sought to be enforced is unconstitutional;(2) by the claim of the respondent that the statute relied on
by the relator as imposing on him the duty sought to be en-
forced is invalid and that therefore he is under no obligation to
perform the same.7
The statute involved in Dickinson neither imposed nor excused the
performance of the duty sought to be enforced.
acterized this as a "bureaucratic dispute," stating: "It is not for us to postulate such im-
pingement from mere pleading allegations here submitted without convincing proof." 251
So. 2d at 276. The doubtful validity of the Comptroller's assertion was revealed by the fact
that on June 3, 1974, less than three years after the Dickinson decision, Comptroller Dickin-
son was the prime mover of a resolution of the Florida Cabinet which transferred supervi-
sion and control of the Carlton Data Center to the Department of General Services. Tran-
script of Cabinet Meeting at 19-21 (Sept. 3, 1974).
75. See supra text accompanying note 27. In the Petition for Mandamus the Comptrol-
ler inserted this rather transparent bid for legitimacy:
5. The Secretary of State, Honorable Richard B. Stone, is charged with the
duty and responsibility of keeping the records of the official acts of the legisla-
tive and executive departments (Article IV, Section 4(b), Florida Constitution,
1968). ...
This duty is ministerial in nature and requires no exercise of discretion.
Petition for Mandamus at 5, Dickinson, 251 So. 2d at 268. The quoted passage is less than
forthright as it suggests that the Secretary's duty consists of more than mere custody. Also,
it implies that it is the described constitutional function that will be the subject of the
court's order in mandamus. The court's willingness to acquiesce in this very dubious claim
for relief by mandamus strongly suggests that, for reasons of its own, the court was quite
determined to assume jurisdiction.
76. See supra text accompanying note 67.
77. 52 Am. JUR. 2D Mandamus § 94 (1970) (footnotes omitted). "[T]he constitutionality
of a statute may be raised in a mandamus proceeding, where the right to the issuance of the
writ is dependent on a determination of this question, and the statute affirmatively imposes
or excuses the performance of some duty." 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 95 (1956) (foot-
notes omitted).
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Finally, the court ordered performance of an act by the re-
spondent that was of no apparent benefit to the petitioner. The
statutory proviso in question became void and inoperable with the
court's holding that it was constitutionally invalid. 8 The further
requirement that it be expunged from the statute added nothing.
The real purpose of the proceeding was to determine the constitu-
tional validity of the statutory proviso that was so offensive to the
comptroller. The proceeding in mandamus was a mere pretext for
invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.
D. Division of Bond Finance v. Smathers
Division of Bond Finance v. Smathers,7' decided in 1976, also
involved a situation purporting to require the immediate attention
of the state's highest court. The 1976 legislature had appended the
following proviso to the annual appropriation for the Division of
Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources:
"Provided that any future sales of general obligation bonds for en-
vironmentally endangered lands shall have as the first priority the
repayment of monies expended for debt service from the Land Ac-
quisition Trust Fund."80 The governor vetoed the proviso, in part
because he doubted its constitutional validity under article VII,
section 11 of the state constitution,81 and in part because he had
been informed by the legislative leadership that the proviso had
been accidentally included in the appropriations bill by drafting
error.8 2 Fearing that the Endangered Lands Bond Program83 would
be jeopardized as a result of widespread doubts concerning the va-
lidity of the proviso and the validity of the governor's attempted
veto,8' the governor and cabinet authorized the Department of
78. See State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 102 So. 739 (Fla. 1924).
79. 337 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1976).
80. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-285, § 1 item 853.
81. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 11(a) provides: "State bonds pledging the full faith and
credit of the state may be issued only to finance or refinance the cost of state capital
projects. . . ." The proviso in question required the expenditure of the proceeds of general
obligation bonds for purposes other than the financing or refinancing of the cost of state
capital projects.
82. 337 So. 2d at 806.
83. FLA. STAT. § 259 (1975).
84. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a) provides: "The governor may veto any specific appropri-
ation in a general appropriation bill, but may not veto any qualification or restriction with-
out also vetoing the appropriation to which it relates." The governor did not wish to veto
the appropriation for the Division of Recreation and Parks, and was afraid that his veto of
the proviso might be considered an unconstitutional veto of a "qualification or restriction."
337 So. 2d at 806.
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General Services' Division of Bond Finance to initiate proceedings
to challenge the constitutional validity of the proviso or to have
the governor's veto declared valid.85 Expressing fear that a harmful
delay might result from a proceeding in the circuit court,8 6 the di-
vision brought an original action for mandamus in the supreme
court to have the proviso declared invalid and ordered expunged
from the statute or, alternatively, to have the governor's veto de-
clared valid.
Justice Boyd, writing for a unanimous court, dutifully ex-
pressed the court's reluctance to consider the issue of statutory in-
validity prior to its consideration by a trial court. However, he con-
tinued, "[T]he remedy of mandamus has been awarded by this
Court in original actions before in order to expunge unconstitu-
tional language from a General Appropriations Act."' 88 Justice
Boyd cited Dickinson as authority for the proposition that the
standard for the court's issuance of such an order to expunge lan-
guage from a statute is whether. "the functions of government will
be adversely affected without an immediate determination." 89 He
continued, "On its face the assertion by the Governor and the Di-
vision that the State Bond Program and Environmentally Endan-
gered Lands Bond Program are jeopardized by the questionable
constitutionality of the proviso and the doubt over the effective-
ness of the Governor's veto meets the Dickinson standard." 90
85. 337 So. 2d at 806-07.
86. "Petitioners have no other available remedy sufficiently speedy to prevent material
injury to the State. Proceedings in the Circuit Court, subject to appeal, could not be com-
pleted in sufficient time to avoid such injury by breach of contract, with the resultant dam-
age to the State's credit reputation." Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 6, Division of Bond
Finance v. Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1976). The governor and cabinet headed both
departments involved in the action.
87. 337 So. 2d at 807. It is noted incidentally that the mandamus facade, consisting of
the request that the Secretary of Sate be ordered to expunge the invalid proviso from the
statute, covered only one of the alternative remedies, as described by both the petition and
the court's opinion. Perhaps it was intended that the proviso be expunged if held invalid or
if vetoed, and there was simply a failure to state the conclusion accurately. Perhaps, on the
other hand, such carelessness of expression was actually a symptom of the legitimizing role
of the writ of mandamus in this particular case.
88. Id. (citing Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1971)). Justice Boyd's language
suggests that this is one of the court's regular procedures and that it applies uniquely to
appropriations acts. Dickinson, however, was the only precedent available to him. Moreover,
the involvement of an appropriations act in the present case, at least, was fortuitous. See
infra note 110.
89. 337 So. 2d at 807. Justice Boyd defined "standard" in terms of the expungement of
the provision from the statute instead of the real issue: the need for an expedited proceed-
ing before the supreme court.
90. Id.
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Justice Boyd found it unnecessary even to consider the valid-
ity of the governor's attempted veto, since the proviso was held to
be, on its face, violative of article VII, section 11(a) of the Florida
Constitution." He thereupon ordered issuance of the peremptory
writ commanding the Secretary of State to expunge the proviso
from the act.2 There were no dissents.
The spurious nature of the court's use of mandamus in this
and similar cases is revealed by the following postscript to the
court's opinion. The invalid proviso was never, in fact, expunged
from, or marked in any way on, the enrolled act that is on file in
the Department of State. The peremptory writ of mandamus "was
inadvertently never issued by the court."93 Such inadvertence
would be quite impossible, of course, if this had been a bona fide
proceeding in mandamus of sufficient importance to require the
immediate attention of the state's highest court. Such an oversight
could only occur in a proceeding in which mandamus was a mere
pretext for the accomplishment of an unrelated purpose. In this
case, that purpose was to bring an adjudication of statutory valid-
ity within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.
The Florida Supreme Court's holding in Division of Bond Fi-
nance was no less abusive of the traditional elements of mandamus
than was its holding in Dickinson. True, the court could now cite
Dickinson as precedent for its action, and because a state bond
program was involved, it may have been easier to believe that an
expedited decision by the state's highest court was necessary.9
Nevertheless, as in Dickinson, there was no suggestion that there
was a preexisting authority in the secretary of state to perform the
act commanded by the peremptory writ. As before, the court or-
dered an action by mandamus that was of no discernible benefit to
91. 337 So. 2d at 807. For the text of article VII, section 11(a), see supra note 81.
92. 337 So. 2d at 807.
93. Letter from Sid White, Clerk of the Supreme Court, to Jack Shreve, Public Counsel
(Oct. 17, 1979). Mr. Shreve was General Counsel for the Department of State at the time
Division of Bond Finance was decided.
94. A recent law review article written by two research aides to members of the Florida
Supreme Court characterized the court's action as follows:
The court has on occasion stretched its mandamus powers to the limit in emer-
gency situations. In Division of Bond Finance v. Smathers, the court expunged
unconstitutional language from a general appropriations act which threatened
the state with an economic calamity even though a challenge to the validity of
the act in circuit court would have achieved the same result.
Borgognoni & Keane, Practice Before the Supreme Court of Florida: A Practical Analysis,
8 STETSON L. REv. 318, 353 (1979) (footnotes omitted). If regular procedures in circuit court
would have achieved the same result, wherein lay the emergency?
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the petitioner. As before, the court created the right that it then
issued the writ to enforce.
E. Brown v. Firestone
Brown v. Firestone5 is the most recent of the line of cases
under discussion. In Brown, certain House leaders, including the
speaker, as citizens and taxpayers, challenged the validity of sev-
eral gubernatorial vetoes of provisions of the General Appropria-
tions Act of 1979." The challenge was by petition to the original
jurisdiction of the supreme court for mandamus to require the Sec-
retary of State to expunge the invalid vetoes from the official
records that were in his custody, and to prevent the Comptroller
from disbursing state funds based on the invalid vetoes.' 7 The
Governor in effect counterclaimed, arguing that certain* of the chal-
lenged vetoes were valid because they pertained to "specific appro-
priations" and that the remainder of the vetoes were valid because
they were directed to provisions that were themselves constitution-
ally invalid. e8
The court, speaking through Justice Sundberg, justified its ac-
ceptance of jurisdiction by citing to Dickinson v. Stone and Divi-
sion of Bond Finance v. Smathers. The court stated:
In both cases we held mandamus to be the appropriate remedy
because the functions of government would have been adversely
affected without an immediate determination. In view of these
recent authorities we are obliged to conclude that the case
before us also requires an immediate determination. The chal-
lenged vetoes have cast doubt upon the expenditure of substan-
tial amounts of public funds. Because this lingering uncertainty
hampers the state's ability to finance ongoing state projects, the
Court will exercise its discretion to consider this case.9
Petitioners' standing to maintain this action in mandamus was
assessed by standards appropriate to any legal challenge to the va-
lidity of a statute, rather than by standards appropriate to actions
in mandamus. Having previously held that a citizen and taxpayer
95. 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980).
96. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-212.
97. 382 So. 2d at 657.
98. Id. at 662. The Governor contended that the provisos violated article III, section 12
of the Florida Constitution, which states that: "Laws making appropriations for salaries of
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could mount a constitutional attack upon the legislature's taxing
and spending power without having to demonstrate a special in-
jury,100 the court now found that these petitioners had standing to
petition for mandamus, although, as citizens and taxpayers,
"[tihey claim no special or extraordinary injury."1 °1 There was no
discussion of the usual critical questions in mandamus proceed-
ings: whether the respondent had clear and preexisting authority
to perform the act sought to be enforced; whether the petitioner
had a clear legal right to the performance of that act; and whether
there was an adequate alternative remedy. 2
On the merits, the court found four of the six challenged ve-
toes valid. As to the two invalid vetoes, the court found that the
vetoed provisions were themselves unconstitutional.10 3 Conse-
quently, although the court had accepted jurisdiction on the basis
of a petition requesting an order commanding expungement of the
invalid vetoes from the official records of the legislature, it actually
found it unnecessary to order such expungement.
The court concluded its opinion with an admonition that its
acceptance of jurisdiction in the instant case should not be con-
strued as a general willingness to become involved in the biennial
power struggle between the legislative and executive branches of
government over appropriations acts. The court concluded that
"[m]andamus is an extremely limited basis for jurisdiction which
traditionally has been, and will continue to be, employed sparingly.
Hence, future attempts to invoke this Court's jurisdiction on simi-
lar grounds will be viewed with great circumspection. '" 104 The court
continued:
To that end we outline the proper shape which similar liti-
gation should assume in the future. Any person, as citizen and
taxpayer, may bring suit and have stricken a gubernatorial veto
of a qualification or restriction in a general appropriations bill,
even if the qualification or restriction is clearly unconstitu-
tional, unless the governor can successfully demonstrate that
the qualification or restriction itself constitutes a specific appro-
100. Department of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
101. 382 So. 2d at 662.
102. See Heath v. Becktell, 327 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); see also supra notes 27-
28. Further evidence of the casualness with which the court was using mandamus proceed-
ings consisted of its reference to the Secretary of State as a "nominal respondent," 382 So.
2d at 657, an unlikely designation in a mandamus proceeding where the Secretary is the
person to whom the court's order will be directed.
103. 382 So. 2d at 669-72.
104. Id. at 671.
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priation within the intendment of article III, section 8(a). In
such a proceeding no issue may be raised as to the constitution-
ality of the qualification or restriction. That is, the governor
cannot counterclaim that his action was prompted by an uncon-
stitutional legislative act. In this context a mandamus action
should be limited to narrow issues of law which do not require
extensive fact-finding.1 0 5
As to challenges to the constitutionality of the provisions of a gen-
eral appropriations act, the court stated that a person as taxpayer
and citizen could bring a declaratory judgment action in the circuit
court, in which a full record can be developed. 10 6
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Firestone is
notable for its lack of forthrightness. First, without expressly over-
ruling Dickinson and Division of Bond Finance, the court effec-
tively repudiated its holdings in those cases that mandamus is a
proper means of challenging the constitutionality of provisions of a
general appropriations act. Actually, the Brown court had relied on
those two cases in coming to the conclusion that it was "obliged"
to give the instant case its immediate attention.1 0 7 It is now obvi-
ous, however, that both Dickinson and Division of Bond Finance
would have been relegated to declaratory judgment proceedings in
the circuit court according to the Brown court's outline of the
"proper shape which similar litigation should assume in the
future."'08
Second, the Brown court's interpretation of Dickinson and Di-
vision of Bond Finance as applying only to general appropriations
acts, and the consequent limitation of its outline for future litiga-
tion to situations involving such acts, is confusing. In both cases
the court accepted jurisdiction "because the functions of govern-
ment would have been adversely affected without an immediate
determination" by the court, 10 9 and not because general appropria-
tions acts were involved." 0 The fact that the cases involved appro-
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 662.
108. Id. at 671.
109. Id.
110. In Dickinson the ground for the final decision, conflict with article III, section 12
of the Florida Constitution, was peculiar to appropriations acts. The ground upon which the
petitioner originally brought the case before the supreme court-that the statute would
transfer supervision and control of personnel and facilities that were essential to the Comp-
troller in the performance of his constitutional duties-was not so peculiar. 251 So. 2d at
273-74. In Division of Bond Finance, the ground for the decision, violation of article VII,
section 11(a) of the Florida Constitution, had no necessary relevance for appropriations acts
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priations acts was largely, if not entirely, fortuitous.
Another problem with the decision in Brown is the distinction
drawn by the court between future challenges to qualifications or
restrictions in appropriations acts and to attempted vetoes thereof.
Surely, unconstitutional vetoes of such qualifications or restrictions
are no more likely to endanger important functions of government
than is the enactment of such qualifications or restrictions in the
first place. If, as the court stated, its primary concern is to protect
important governmental functions from being endangered,' it is
unclear why challenges to substantive provisions should be rele-
gated to declaratory judgment proceedings in the circuit court,
while challenges to attempted vetoes of substantive provisions con-
tinue to be permitted by mandamus in the supreme court.
The court's stated basis for this distinction is that a factual
record is necessary in determining the constitutionality of a statu-
tory provision.12 This rationale, however, must be viewed with
skepticism. The possibility always exists that a factual record
might be needed in a given case. The argument with which the
Comptroller originally petitioned the court in Dickinson fairly
bristled with the kind of uncertainty that demands a factual re-
cord." s If the need for an instant determination by the state's
highest court is as compelling as was indicated in Dickinson, Divi-
sion of Bond Finance and Brown, was it not also sufficiently com-
pelling to override the procedural problem of creating a factual re-
cord? In the very few cases before the supreme court that would
reach that level of urgency, the court could appoint a commissioner
to take testimony and prepare the required record."' Actually, the
court simply wished to withdraw from an untenable procedure into
which it had slipped in those earlier cases. It should have said so.
Finally, the Brown court failed even to mention what was un-
doubtedly a contributing reason for the timing of its withdrawal
from the Dickinson and Division of Bond Finance precedents. On
March 11, 1980, just two days before the court issued its opinion in
the Brown case, the people of Florida approved a constitutional
amendment that largely eliminated the problem that gave rise to
per se. 337 So. 2d at 807.
111. 382 So. 2d at 662; see supra text accompanying note 104.
112. 382 So. 2d at 671.
113. See supra note 74.
114. See, e.g., McCarty v. Booth, 69 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla. 1954) ("In extremely rare
instances this court has found it necessary to have testimony taken and has appointed a
circuit judge as commissioner for that purpose."); State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress Co., 117
Fla. 791, 158 So. 456 (1935).
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the aberrational procedures of those cases in the first place. " 5 The
1980 amendment created section 3(b)(5) of article V, which states
that the supreme court:
[mlay review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by
the district court of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be
of great public importance, or to have a great effect on the
proper administration of justice throughout the state, and certi-
fied to require immediate resolution by the supreme court."'
This means that upon certification by a district court of ap-
peal," 7 the Florida Supreme Court can immediately and authorita-
tively review a matter that is properly initiated at the trial court
level without having to contrive to hear it under its original juris-
diction. The extraordinary procedures of the Dickinson and Divi-
sion of Bond Finance cases are no longer necessary. The court
should have said so.
F. Conclusion
A search for possible precedents for the peremptory order of
the Circuit Court for Leon County in State ex rel. Smith v. Fire-
stone,"8 ordering the Secretary of State to expunge specified word-
ing from an act of the legislature, uncovered only four arguably
applicable Florida Supreme Court decisions."' Each was initiated
by a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the secretary of
state to expunge material from the legislative records in his official
custody. 20 Only in State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, however, was ex-
115. See 1980 Fla. Laws S.J.R. No. 20-C.
116. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5).
117. The original version of this provision, as recommended by the Florida Supreme
Court in 1979, would have placed complete control of the ability to hear cases in the su-
preme court. That version read: "[The supreme court] [m]ay, on its own initiative only,
review any order, judgment or decision of any court of this state which substantially affects
the general public interest or the proper administration of justice throughout the state." See
England, Jr., 1979 Report on the Florida Judiciary, 53 FLA. B.J. 296, 304 app. C § 3(b)(7)
(1979).
118. No. 80-2354 (2d Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1980).
119. Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980); Division of Bond Finance v.
Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1976); Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1971); State
ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d 721 (1943).
120. In Watson the Secretary of State was directed to expunge from a statute material
that was "spurious" and not part of the law because never approved by the legislature. In
Dickinson and Division of Bond Finance, the Secretary was directed to expunge from stat-
utes wording that had been held unconstitutional in those cases. In Brown the court ac-
cepted jurisdiction in order to require the Secretary to expunge all references to allegedly
invalid vetoes from the legislative records in his custody; on the merits, however, the court
found it unnecessary to order such expungement.
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pungement per se the actual objective of the proceeding. There,
the Attorney General sought to have the spurious material re-
moved from the legislative act in order to avoid having it appear in
the 1943 Laws of Florida that were shortly to be published by the
Secretary of State.121 In the other three cases, mandamus was
merely employed as an expedient means of enabling petitioners to
bring a challenge to the validity of a statute within the original
jurisdiction of the supreme court.122 In none of those cases could
expungement per se have contributed in any way to the legitimate
interests of the petitioner. Moreover, in none of the four opinions
was there any acknowledgment of the absence from those cases of
the usual prerequisites for the mandamus remedy: a clear author-
ity and duty in the respondent to perform the act sought to be
enforced and a clear legal right to that performance in the
petitioner.
On the merits, it would be difficult to find fault with the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's handling of the four cases under discussion.
The wording challenged in Watson was clearly spurious and not
part of the law; the provisions challenged in Dickinson and Divi-
sion of Bond Finance were clearly unconstitutional; and, in Brown,
the court established clear and authoritative boundaries to both
the legislature's power to attach qualifications and restrictions to
appropriations and to the governor's power to veto items of appro-
priations acts. What is disturbing about these cases, however, is
that they imply that the secretary of state actually has the author-
ity to alter the official legislative records in appropriate circum-
stances, and that the extraordinary writ of mandamus can be thus
subverted by the Florida Supreme Court for the sole purpose of
bringing a matter before the court that it could not otherwise hear.
The Brown court apparently had misgivings concerning one or
more of the implications of the earlier cases, for it seized upon the
opportunity to withdraw from dangerous territory. Yet, the court
in Brown left open the question of the appropriateness of a judicial
order to the secretary of state requiring him to expunge matter
from an act of the legislature.
This question was answered in the recent case of Department
of Education v. Lewis. " ' Lewis was a proceeding for a declaratory
judgment to test the validity of a certain proviso in the 1981 Gen-
121. See supra text accompanying note 45.
122. See supra note 120.
123. 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982).
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eral Appropriations Act. 24 Pursuant to the procedure established
by the 1980 constitutional amendment discussed above,"' the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal for the First District certified to the Florida
Supreme Court the trial court's decision upholding the validity of
the proviso." 6
On the merits, the supreme court reversed, holding the chal-
lenged proviso to be unconstitutional.12 7 The opinion, written by
Justice Boyd, closed as follows: "The proviso quoted at the begin-
ning of this opinion is unconstitutional and void. The Comptroller
is directed to disregard it. The Secretary of State is directed to
strike it from chapter 81-206. ' ' 128 The first of the quoted sentences
merely summarizes the holding. The second is redundant, though
harmless; it merely states the natural consequence of a holding of
statutory invalidity. The third sentence makes no sense at all.
True, the enrolled act is in the custody of the Department of State,
of which the secretary is department head, and it is obviously sus-
ceptible to physical alteration. But to what end? The pamphlet law
and session law versions of chapter 81-206 had long since been
published and distributed. Moreover, appropriations acts, not be-
ing of a "general and permanent nature," are not even codified in
the Florida Statutes.129 It is likely, therefore, that no one would
ever have looked at that document were it not for the court's order
to expunge wording from it; and it is equally likely that no one will
ever examine it again. Of what possible significance, then, was the
supreme court's directive to the Secretary of State to strike from
chapter 81-206 the invalid proviso? Apparently, there is none.
The Florida Supreme Court's demonstrated obsession with the
notion that it is appropriate for the judiciary to order alteration of
the official legislative record is both ironic and disturbing. It is
ironic in that what originated as a pretext for asserting original
jurisdiction has acquired a life and momentum of its own. It is dis-
turbing that such a notion, having implanted itself in the minds of
the justices of the state's highest court, could well become part of
the general jurisprudence of the state. It is difficult to imagine a
more blatant violation of the separation of powers principle. The
executive and judicial branches of Florida government should not
124. 1981 Fla. Laws ch. 81-206, § 1.
125. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5); see supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
126. 416 So. 2d at 457.
127. Id. at 463.
128. Id.
129. See FLA. STAT. § 11.242(5)(c) (1981).
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assume an authority to alter the official records of the legislative
branch.
Also disturbing is the prospect that the distortions of manda-
mus that were introduced by the Dickinson and Division of Bond
Finance cases may also have become part of the state's jurispru-
dence. Although those cases were effectively repudiated by Brown
insofar as the future jurisdiction of the supreme court is con-
cerned, they were not repudiated in terms that vindicate the writ
of mandamus. Mandamus should not be used when the prerequi-
sites for its issuance are absent. 30 It is hoped that the order issued
by the Circuit Court for Leon County in Firestone will prove to be
only an aberration, and that the disturbing prospect will not come
to pass. At its first opportunity, the Florida Supreme Court should
confirm that the historic writ of mandamus is what it has always
been-nothing more, nothing less.
III. VARIATIONS IN STATUTORY TEXT
Spurious legislation consists of wording in the enrolled bill ap-
proved by the governor that was not present in the bill as enacted
by the legislature. It must be recognized, however, that human er-
ror is equally disposed toward other forms of variations in wording.
Thus, a variation may also consist of wording that has been errone-
ously omitted from the enrolled bill and wording that has been
both added and omitted-i.e., simply changed. The following sec-
tions propose an appropriate framework for determining the conse-
quence of such material variations of wording.
A. Journal Entry Rule Versus Enrolled Bill Rule
The question under discussion-i.e., What is the consequence
of a variation in wording between an enrolled bill that has been
approved by the governor and the same bill as enacted by the leg-
islature? (hereafter, simply "variation")-could never legally arise
in half of American jurisdictions, including the federal courts."'1
Following the so-called "enrolled bill" rule,13 2 the courts of those
jurisdictions consider the enrolled bill that has become law the
best evidence of the content of the statute and of the fact that it
130. For the prerequisites for issuance of the writ of mandamus, see supra text accom-
panying notes 27-28.
131. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
132. 1 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 15.03 (4th ed. 1972); 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 88, 90 (1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 83 (1953).
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was enacted in full accordance with constitutional procedural re-
quirements. In other words, the courts cannot resort to any other
evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, for the purpose of
impugning the enrolled act.133
In the remaining jurisdictions, including Florida,'1 34 which fol-
low the so-called "journal entry" or "affirmative contradiction"
rule, 35 the question of the effect of such a variation can legally
arise. In those jurisdictions, the enrolled bill constitutes only prima
facie evidence of the statute's content and of the validity of the
procedures by which it was enacted. Positive evidence from the
legislative journals can be used to impugn the enrolled bill.'3
B. Materiality
It is unlikely that the law of any jurisdiction requires absolute
identity between the bill enacted by the legislature and the en-
rolled bill presented to the governor for his approval. Of necessity,
there must be some leeway by which minor typographical or cleri-
cal errors can be corrected. 37 Certainly, this is true in Florida.138
133. See authorities cited supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., State ex ret. Watson v. Gray, 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d 721 (1943); State ex
rel. Markens v. Brown, 20 Fla. 407 (1884).
135. 1 C. SANDS, supra note 132, § 15.04; 73 Am. JUR. 2D Statutes § 88 (1974); 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 83 (1953).
136. See authorities cited supra note 135.
137. 1 C. SANDS, supra note 132, § 15.17 (Absolute correspondence is not required. Mi-
nor discrepancies and clerical errors which do not change the substance and legal effect of
the statute will be disregarded.).
138. In Haworth v. Chapman, 113 Fla. 591, 152 So. 663 (1933), for example, the defend-
ant in a criminal action argued that a statutory provision reading "Any person or persons
guilty of violating the provisions of Section 1 of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dol-
lars and ten years in the State penitentiary" was unconstitutionally vague because it failed
to specify that imprisonment was authorized. 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8466, § 2. The Florida
Supreme Court supplied the words "imprisonment for" before the words "ten years in the
State penitentiary," saying that this was "merely to supply words obviously intended to be
used but inadvertently or accidentally omitted in transcribing the bill in the Legislature,
and for this there is ample precedent." 113 Fla. at 597, 152 So. at 665.
In Sebesta v. Miklas, 272 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1972), the court had before it a statute pro-
viding for a single unified government for Hillsborough County. Davis Islands, constituting
Precinct 3, had been clerically omitted from the description of District No. 2. It was evident,
however, from several sources, including maps, summaries of legislation, population figures,
and the like, that its inclusion in District No. 2 was intended throughout and that the omis-
sion was purely inadvertent. Id. at 144-45. The Florida Supreme Court construed the statute
as including the missing reference, saying that "it would seem that if the legislative intent
with regard to a word or phrase omitted from a statute is readily ascertainable, whether or
not such intent appears from the content of the statute itself, then this Court may supply
such omitted word or phrase." Id. at 145; see also Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So.
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It is material variations that are of concern, in that they ex-
ceed what the courts of the given jurisdiction are willing to correct
in the course of construing a statute. Presumably, variations re-
sulting from erroneously engrossing or failing to engross amend-
ments are material since they were the specific object of legislative
attention. 3 '
C. Total Versus Partial Invalidity
The requirement of article III, section 8(a) of the Florida Con-
stitution that "[elvery bill passed by the legislature shall be
presented to the governor for his approval' 14 0 clearly implies that
the document that is presented to the governor must be essentially
the same as the one passed by the legislature. To the extent, there-
fore, that a material variation between the two versions of a bill
exists, there is some degree of constitutional invalidity.
The question necessarily arises, however, whether such inva-
lidity is to be viewed as infecting the entire bill or only the portion
represented by the variance. Logic points as clearly in the one di-
rection as in the other. When there is a material variation between
the two versions of a bill, it can reasonably be said that the bill
presented to the governor is not the same bill that was passed by
the legislature. On the other hand, it can just as reasonably be said
that, except for the variance, it is the same bill.
The weight of authority favors the proposition that "[i]f there
is a material variance between the bill passed and the bill
presented to the chief executive, the latter cannot properly be said
to be the same bill which was passed by the legislature, and the
entire enactment is invalidated."'" As we shall see, however, the
Florida courts have taken the position that the holding of invalid-
ity in such circumstances initially applies only to that portion of
the bill that is represented by the variation. 11
2d 422 (Fla. 1963); In re Estate of Sherman, 146 Fla. 643, 1 So. 2d 727 (1941).
139. Certainly the variations which occurred in State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone as a
result of the erroneous engrossment of four amendments would be considered material. The
presence of the amendments caused the House to refuse to pass the bill. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-16.
140. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a).
141. 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 70 (1974); see also State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246
Minn. 181, 74 N.W. 2d 249 (1956); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 60(b) (1953).
142. See State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d 721 (1943); Gwynn v.





If a statute is held to be partially invalid, the court must then
decide whether the valid and invalid portions are severable from
each other.""3 If severable, the obligation of the court is to give ef-
fect to the remaining valid portion. Severability is a question of
legislative intent.'" A statute will be considered severable if it is
determined that the legislature would have enacted the valid por-
tion even if the invalid portion had not been presented to it.1 ' 5
Normally, this inquiry as to legislative intent would require a sub-
stantive analysis of both portions of the statute, their relationship
to each other, and their relationship to the legislature's purpose in
the enactment of the legislation.
Statutes that are partially invalid because of variations are not
immune from the need for severability analysis. There is an added
factor, however, when such variations result from the engrossment
of amendments that failed of enactment or when there is a failure
to engross amendments that were enacted. The added factor is
that the legislature, in the course of acting on the amendments,
has actually expressed its intent, either affirmatively or negatively,
as to the valid portion of the statute. The importance of such ex-
pressions of legislative intent will vary from being relatively slight
to being decisive, depending on the circumstances in which the va-
riation occurred.
Consider, for example, a variation consisting of spurious lan-
guage." 6 Regardless of the source of the spurious wording, it may
be conclusively presumed that the legislature would have enacted
the valid portion of the bill without the spurious invalid portion,
since it actually did so. Thus, there is very little that the usual
severability analysis can add to that showing of legislative intent.
Consider, next, a variation resulting from the erroneous en-
143. "In judicial usage the terms 'separable,' 'severable,' and 'divisible' are syno-
nomous." 2 C. SANDS, supra note 132, § 44.01.
144. This inquiry is in response to the well-established principle that a court is obli-
gated to give the fullest possible effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.
145. See, e.g., Barndollar v. Sunset Realty Corp., 379 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1979); State v.
Lee, 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978); High Ridge Management Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla.
1978); Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,
109 Fla. 477, 149 So. 8 (1933); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 383 (1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 93
(1942); 1 T. COOLEY, COOLEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 359-68 (8th ed. 1927).
146. Spurious wording can result either from the omission at engrossment of an amend-
ment enacted by the legislature, which would have deleted wording from the bill, or from
the engrossment of an amendment rejected by the legislature, which would have added
wording to the bill.
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grossment of an amendment, rejected by the legislature, which
would have deleted wording from the bill.'4 By rejecting the
amendment, the legislature in effect rejected the text that would
have resulted from the proposed deletion of wording-i.e., the text
of the enrolled bill approved by the executive. Although this scena-
rio gives rise to a fairly strong inference of negative legislative in-
tent, it could be overcome by contrary conclusions drawn as the
result of the normal severability analysis previously described.'4 8
Finally, consider the situation in which an amendment that
would have added wording to the bill was enacted by both houses
of the legislature, but was then erroneously omitted from the en-
rolled bill. Because the legislature actually altered the text of the
bill, one could infer a negative legislative intent. Again, however, it
would be a relatively weak inference of legislative intent that could
be overcome by contrary conclusions from the usual severability
analysis.
E. The Spurious Legislation Cases
1. STATE EX REL. BOYD V. DEAL
The earliest Florida decision involving the problem of spurious
legislation was State ex rel. Boyd v. Deal, ' 9 decided in 1888. Deal
involved a bill consisting of thirty-one sections that was passed by
the Florida Senate. 50 The House amended the bill by striking eve-
rything after the enacting clause and substituting eight new sec-
tions." The Senate concurred in this House amendment. 1 2 The
enrolling clerk, however, treated the House amendment as if it
merely substituted the eight new sections for the first eight sec-
tions of the original thirty-one-section bill. Thus, the enrolled bill
that was presented to the governor for his approval consisted of
the eight sections inserted by the House amendment as well as sec-
tions 9 through 31 of the original Senate bill." 8 The governor ap-
proved the bill and it apparently became law."14
147. This, indeed, was the posture of amendments 1, 2, and 3 to Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 348, which was before the court in State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone. See infra
note 189.
148. See supra text accompanying note 145.
149. 24 Fla. 293, 4 So. 899 (1888).
150. FLA. S.B. 74, 1887 Reg. Sess.; FLA. S. JOUR., 1887 Reg. Seass. at 336.
151. FLA. H.R. JoUR., 1887 Reg. Seass. at 690.
152. FLA. S. JoUR., 1887 Reg. Sess. at 741.
153. 24 Fla. at 294, 4 So. at 900.
154. 1887 Fla. Laws ch. 3780.
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The relators in this original action in mandamus, who were
members of the city council of Palatka, sought to compel the re-
spondent city assessor to assess property located within the city
under section 7 of the act. " The respondent assessor argued that
the assessments should be made pursuant to general law rather
than under the act, since section 30 of the act provided that it was
not to go into effect until the mayor and councilmen had been
elected and qualified under it. The relators then argued that sec-
tion 30 was not part of the act, since only sections 1 through 8 had
been properly enacted by both houses of the legislature. "
The majority justices concluded, virtually without discussion,
that sections 9 through 31 were indeed invalid because they had
never been enacted by the two houses of the legislature.15 7 The re-
mainder of the opinion was then directed to the question whether
the first eight sections of the act were nevertheless valid and
enforceable.
Sections 1 through 8 of the act were obviously severable from
the remaining sections, in that they could stand alone and cer-
tainly in that the legislature had actually intended that they be
enacted in the place of the original thirty-one sections. " The ma-
jority justices discerned an added consideration, however, when
there were obvious inconsistencies between the valid and invalid
portions, as here.'59 They were concerned that in exercising his
veto power, the governor might have been influenced to approve
the bill by the portion that had not received legislative sanc-
155. 24 Fla. at 311, 4 So. at 907-08 (Maxwell, C.J., dissenting). It is interesting to note
that the spurious portion of the statute in question was attacked by the party urging en-
forcement of the non-spurious portion, rather than by the party seeking to avoid its effect.
156. Id. at 311, 4 So. at 908 (Maxwell, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 298, 4 So. at 902.
158. See supra text accompanying note 151. The court recognized that "[i]t is a rule
that if, when the unconstitutional part is stricken out, that which remains is complete in
itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent,
wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. ... 24 Fla. at 303, 4
So. at 904 (citing 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 145, at 362).
159. In short, the majority rejected the usual statement of the severability rule that
required only that the valid portion of the statute be able to stand alone and that it ade-
quately express the intent of the legislature. Instead, they took the view that the valid por-
tion should be upheld as enforceable only
when there is in the invalid portion nothing which shows a different legislative
intent, as to the subject matter of the genuine parts, than is shown by the latter,
and the latter parts are sufficient to secure or authorize an enforcement of this
extent . . . without the aid of whatever there may be in the invalid parts . . ..
24 Fla. at 304, 4 So. at 904. The statute under review failed to meet this test.
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tion-i.e., the spurious part. 60 Observing that the Florida governor
is an integral part of the lawmaking process, the court concluded
that he could not properly perform his legislative role when there
was such diversity and inconsistency between the spurious portion
and the valid portion, as in the instant case."" The court thus con-
cluded that the valid and invalid portions of the act were not sev-
erable and that the act was therefore void in its entirety. 62
Chief Justice Maxwell dissented.' s5 He viewed the governor's
role in approving or disapproving legislation as essentially negative
in nature, rather than legislative, because the governor is author-
ized only to negate legislation, not to participate in its enact-
ment.'" Therefore, he could see no reason for applying a different
rule of severability to statutes containing spurious material, as
here, than would be applied to statutes held partially invalid on
other grounds. According to Chief Justice Maxwell, if the remain-
ing valid portion accurately expressed the legislative intent, that
portion should have been enforced.' 15 The dissent concluded that
the first eight sections were obviously severable in this sense and
therefore should have been valid and enforceable. 6
160. Id. at 306, 4 So. at 905-06.
161. Id. at 306-10, 4 So. at 905-07.
Whenever an ostensibly perfect bill is submitted to the governor for his ac-
tion as a part of the lawmaking power, and he considers and approves its several
parts collectively and with the idea that they are all valid, and it subsequently
appears that some of them are spurious, a court should hesitate before pro-
nouncing any of its parts to have the force of law; and should not give them such
effect unless it is entirely clear that the spurious parts are such as could not have
influenced him to approve the other parts, or, in other words, unless the latter
are entirely severable, or distinct and independent, from the former.
Id. at 310, 4 So. at 907.
162. Id. at 310, 4 So. at 907.
163. Id. at 311, 4 So. at 907 (Maxwell, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 315-18, 4 So. at 910-11 (Maxwell, C.J., dissenting).
When an act is passed and presented to the Governor for his approval, it is
not because that approval is necessary to make it a law; for it becomes a law
irrespective of his approval, if he does not challenge it by a veto; and, even if he
vetoes it, it may become a law independent of him by a two-thirds vote of the
two houses of the Legislature. It is clear, therefore, that the Governor's agency in
the passage of laws is not affirmative, but only a sign to indicate that he has no
veto to interpose.
Id. at 317, 4 So. at 910.
165. Id. at 315, 4 So. at 909.
166. Id. at 319-20, 4 So. at 911.
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2. GWYNN V. HARDEE
In Gwynn v. Hardee,'167 the Florida Supreme Court adopted
the position enunciated by Chief Justice Maxwell in his Deal dis-
sent: that the principle of severability should apply in the same
form to statutes that are partially invalid because they contain
spurious language and to statutes that are partially invalid on
other grounds. The issue in Hardee was whether the state school-
book commission could be enjoined from proceeding under a con-
tract for the purchase of school books because, pursuant to the
terms of the contract, a certain statutory provision'6" would not be
applied." 9 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the commis-
sion could not be enjoined because the statutory provision involved
"was not passed by the Legislature, but was inadvertently and by
mistake of the committee clerks written into the engrossed and en-
rolled copies of the bill after its passage,"' 70 and was thus "void
and ineffective" and not binding upon the commission.
In an opinion written by Circuit Judge Campbell, the court
then turned to the question of whether the existence of such spuri-
ous language vitiated the entire act. The court expressly rejected
any notion that there was an added factor of possible influence on
the governor's exercise of his veto power resulting from the admit-
tedly spurious language. Indeed, the Hardee court concluded to
the contrary, that the logic favoring a finding of severability was
even stronger in such cases as this. The court explained:
There are more compelling reasons for excluding a spurious
portion of the law because never enacted and permitting the
other portions validly enacted to remain than for permitting to
remain as enforceable valid portions of an act, parts of which
have been held void because unconstitutional. In the former sit-
uation, unless the spurious matter is taken out and the law per-
mitted to stand as it passed, the entire legislative intent would
be thwarted because of the matters interpolated into the bill by
mistake or otherwise which were never intended by the legisla-
tive bodies.17 2
167. 92 Fla. 543, 110 So. 343 (1926).
168. 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8500, § 12.
169. 92 Fla. at 551-52, 110 So. at 344-46.
170. Id. at 552, 110 So. at 346.
171. Id. at 555-58, 110 So. at 347-48.
172. Id. at 557, 110 So. at 348.
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3. STATE EX REL. WATSON V. GRAY
In State ex rel. Watson v. Gray,17 the court again faced the
problem of spurious language in a legislative act.17 4 An amendment
that would have added wording to a bill was rejected by both
houses of the legislature, but was then erroneously engrossed into
the bill for presentation to the governor, who later approved it.' 7"
The court, on the basis of the legislative journals, concluded that
the portion erroneously included in the bill "was spurious and ille-
gal and should be stricken,' 7 6 while it left the remaining portion
of the act valid and enforceable.
Despite this clear finding of partial invalidity, the court never
even mentioned the issue of severability, probably because the con-
clusion was thought to be too obvious. Since the amendment in
question had been expressly rejected by both houses, there was no
doubt that it met the usual test of severability, i.e., that the legisla-
ture would have enacted the valid portion alone. Unfortunately,
the majority justices missed an opportunity to clarify the question
raised in Deal and Hardee: whether the doctrine of severability
should be applied differently to statutes containing spurious lan-
guage than to statutes that are partially invalid on other constitu-
tional grounds.
F. Variations in Statute Titles
A brief digression is required with respect to variations that
occur in the titles of legislative acts instead of in the text. Since
the title does not become a part of the law, but is intended only to
provide notice of the content of a bill throughout the legislative
process,177 it would seem that the principle of severability, per se,
would not apply to those variations. Instead, the determination of
whether a legislative act will survive a material variation in its title
should turn on the question of whether the title as enacted by both
houses of the legislature was adequate to provide the notice re-
173. 153 Fla. 462, 14 So. 2d 721 (1943).
174. Watson was discussed earlier in terms of the precedent it provided for a court to
order the Secretary of State to expunge spurious wording from an enrolled act that is in his
custody. See supra text accompanying notes 39-59.
175. 153 Fla. at 462, 14 So. 2d at 721. For a more detailed discussion of the facts in
Watson see supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
176. 153 Fla. at 464, 14 So. 2d at 722.




quired by the constitution. 17 After all, by the time the enrolled
version of the bill is presented to the governor for his approval, the
title of the bill has substantially served its purpose. The governor's
decision to approve or disapprove the act should surely be based
on more than a mere reading of the title.179
Although the Florida courts have scarcely discussed the notice
requirement in any of the Florida cases involving material varia-
tions in the titles of legislative acts, their outcomes are generally
consistent with the suggested analysis.180 In State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Green,'' for example, although the court's opinion con-
tains a substantial discussion of the issue of severabilitys 2 the
court nevertheless upheld the validity of the statute on the ground
that the title, even without its spurious language, gave adequate
notice of the content of the bill. 8 '
G. Conclusion: The Validity of Chapter 80-257
The highly unusual order of the circuit court in State ex rel.
Smith v. Firestone'84 directing the Secretary of State to expunge
certain wording from an enrolled act that was in the Secretary's
official custody triggered the present inquiry. It is therefore appro-
priate that this paper conclude with an assessment of that order's
efficacy in light of the precedents and principles that have been
discussed and with an inquiry into the current constitutional sta-
tus of chapter 80-257.
If the petition for mandamus that resulted in the order to ex-
punge was indeed intended to assure that the "proper text" of
chapter 80-257, Laws of Florida,' 8 would be available for inclusion
178. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
179. This consideration probably accounts for the remark by the Florida Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Green, 36 Fla. 154, 175, 18 So. 334, 337 (1895):
It may be that the necessity and reasons for the requirement that the subject of
an act shall be restricted to the subject expressed in the title as it passed the
legislative bodies do not exist with the same urgency as applied to the approval
of the law by the governor ....
180. See, e.g., State ex rel. Landis v. City of Sanford, 113 Fla. 750, 152 So. 193 (1934);
Freeman v. Simmons, 107 Fla. 438, 145 So. 187 (1932); Wade v. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla.
628, 41 So. 72 (1906).
181. 36 Fla. 154, 18 So. 334 (1895).
182. Id. at 174-80, 18 So. at 331-38.
183. Id. at 178-79, 18 So. at 337-38.
184. No. 80-2354 (2d Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1980). For a discussion of the facts in Firestone,
see supra text accompanying notes 1-23.
185. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-257.
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in the then-forthcoming edition of the Florida Statutes,'86 it cer-
tainly failed in that endeavor. Not only was the wording that was
ordered to be expunged inaccurately identified," 7 but providing
the "proper text" of the act would also have required the insertion
of wording that had been deleted as a result of the erroneous en-
grossment of the same amendment,"s as well as the three other
186. See Motion to Expedite at 1, State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone, No. 80-2354 (2d Cir.
Ct. Sept. 5, 1980); supra text accompanying note 22.
187. The following quotation of the language ordered to be expunged was the text of
the erroneously engrossed Senate amendment 4 to House amendment 1. See FLA. C.S./S.B.
348, 1980 Reg. Sess., amend. 4 to House amend. 1, FLA. S. JoUR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 959. The
underlined portion, however, was also a part of the text of House amendment 1 and there-
fore was in no sense spurious:
Each application for approval of the establishment and maintenance of a branch
office shall state the proposed location thereof, the need therefore, the functions
to be performed therein, the estimated volume of business thereof, the estimated
annual expense thereof, and the mode of payment therefor. Each such applica-
tion shall be accompanied by a budget of the association for the current earnings
period and for the next succeeding semi-annual period, which reflects the esti-
mated additional expense of the maintenance of such a branch office.
State ex rel. Smith v. Firestone, No. 80-2354, slip op. at 1. See FLA. C.S./S.B. 348, 1980 Reg.
Sess., § 665.030(1)(c), FLA. H.R. JoUR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 720.
188. The wording which Senate amendment 4 to House amendment 1 would have de-
leted, and which therefore should have been left in the bill when Senate amendment 4 was
withdrawn, can be found in proposed section 665.030(1)(c) and (d). FLA. C.S./S.B. 348, 1980
Reg. Sess., § 665.030(1)(c), (d), FLA. H.R. JouR., 1980 Reg. Sess. at 720.
(c) . . . Each application for approval of the establishment and maintenance
of a branch office shall be in such form as the department may prescribe and
shall state:
1. The proposed location thereof;
2. The functions to be performed therein;
3. The estimated volume of business thereof;
4. The estimated annual expense thereof;
5. The mode of payment therefor; and
6. Such other information as the department may require.
(d) Upon receipt by the department of such an application, it shall consider
the following:
1. The sufficiency of capital accounts to support the associa-
tion's deposit base and the additional fixed assets proposed for
the branch and its operations, without undue exposure to its
depositors, members or stockholders.
2. The sufficiency of earnings and earnings prospects to sup-
port the anticipated expenses of the branch, without jeopard-
izing the financial position of the association.
3. The sufficiency and quality of management available to op-
erate the branch.
4. The name of the proposed branch reasonably identifies the
branch and is not likely to unduly confuse the public.
5. The association's substantial compliance with all state and
federal law affecting its operations.
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erroneously engrossed amendments. 89
The more important question, of course, is whether the result-
ing invalidity of chapter 80-257 was total or only partial. An adju-
dication of this question could go either way. On the one hand,
since the discrepancies in the text of the enrolled bill resulted from
the erroneous engrossment of formal amendments offered to the
bill, there is no doubt as to their materiality.190 Also, since the
amendments had actually passed the Senate and were then with-
189. The wording which was deleted as the result of the erroneous engrossment into the
bill of Senate amendment 1 to House amendment 1 can be found in proposed section
665.020(5)(a). FLA. C.S./S.B. 348, 1980 Reg. Sess., § 665.020(5)(a), FLA. H.R. JOUR., 1980
Reg. Sess. at 715.
(a) ... In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this
paragraph the department shall consider all materially relevant factors
including:
1. The location and services offered by existing associations in the general
service area as indicative of the competitive climate of the market.
2. The area's general economic and demographic characteristics.
The wording which was deleted as the result of the erroneous engrossment into the bill of
Senate amendment 2 to House amendment 1 can be found in proposed section
665.020(5)(b). FLA. C.S./S.B. 348, 1980 Reg. Sess., § 665.020(5)(b), FLA. H.R. JoUR., 1980
Reg. Sess. at 715.
(b) . . . In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this
paragraph the department shall consider all materially relevant factors
including:
1. Current economic conditions and the growth potential of the community
in which the proposed association intends to locate.
2. The growth rate, size, financial strength, and operating characteristics of
associations in the general service area of the proposed association.
The wording which was deleted as the result of the erroneous engrossment into the bill of
Senate amendment 3 to House amendment 1 can be found in proposed section
665.020(5)(d). FLA. C.S./S.B. 348, 1980 Reg. Sess., § 665.020(5)(d), FLA. H.R. JOUR., 1980
Reg. Sess. at 715.
(d). . . In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this
paragraph the following minimum capitalization requirements must be met:
1. $2,000,000 in savings account capital for a mutual association or
$1,500,000 in voting common capital stock for a capital stock association if the
population of the community in which the association is to have its home office
does not exceed 100,000.
2. $2,500,000 in savings account capital for a mutual association or
$2,000,000 in voting common capital stock for a capital stock association if the
population of the community in which the association is to have its home office
exceeds 100,000.
3. Every capital stock association hereafter organized shall establish, in ad-
dition to the capital required by this section, a paid-in surplus equal in amount
to not less than 20 percent of its paid-in capital.
The department may, however, in its discretion, require a larger amount by
rule. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require any existing associ-
ation to increase its capital structure over that existing on the effective date of
this act.
190. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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drawn at the insistence of the House'91 -the obvious alternative
being the death of the bill or its reference to a conference commit-
tee-the negative inference as to legislative intent is somewhat
stronger than would otherwise be the case. '92
On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that a
severability analysis would support a finding of partial, rather than
total, invalidity. It simply does not seem that the segments of the
statute affected-whether taken individually or in combina-
tion-were sufficiently important to require an inference that the
legislature would not have enacted this long and complex regula-
tory measure without them. Actually, the text remaining after the
deletions resulting from the erroneous engrossment of Senate
amendments 1 and 2, respectively, was substantially the same as in
the preexisting law."' 3 Moreover, there is little reason to believe
that the text added by House amendment 1 and then deleted by
the erroneous engrossment of those two amendments was really
that important.1 9
Although the textual discrepancy resulting from the erroneous
engrossment of Senate amendment 4 was more complex, since it
consisted of both the deletion and addition of wording, the statu-
tory segment involved only the kind of information the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance was to consider in approving the es-
tablishment of branch offices.1 95 Surely this segment was not of
great consequence and could have been omitted from the regula-
tory scheme. 196
In view of this uncertainty as to whether chapter 80-257 was
susceptible to being held totally or only partially invalid, what cor-
rective measures should the legislature have taken? The best possi-
ble procedure in these circumstances would have been the immedi-
191. See supra text accompanying note 13.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48.
193. See FLA. STAT. § 665.031(4)(a), (b) (1979).
194. In each instance, the wording that was erroneously deleted merely specified the
various factors that were to be taken into account by the department in making the sub-
stantive determination that the remaining, relatively unchanged wording required. See
supra note 189.
195. FLA. STAT. § 665.028(1)(c) (Supp. 1980).
196. It is true that the wording remaining after the deletions resulting from the errone-
ous engrossment of Senate amendment 3 to House amendment 1 required that the proposed
capital structure be "adequate," FLA. STAT. § 665.0201(5)(d)(1981), whereas House amend-
ment 1 had established specific "minimum capitalization requirements." FLA. C.S./S.B. 348,
1980 Reg. Seass., § 665.020(5)(d), FLA. H.R. JouR., 1980 Reg. Seas. at 715. Although the
change introduced by the House amendment and erroneously deleted was to that extent
substantive, it was hardly momentous.
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ate reenactment of the equivalent of Committee Substitute for
Senate bill 348, properly engrossed. From the time of such reenact-
ment, that procedure would have been completely efficacious re-
gardless of which view concerning the degree of statutory invalidity
finally prevailed. For reasons of its own, however, the legislature
did not avail itself of an early opportunity to perform this neces-
sary remedial procedure during a one-day special session that oc-
curred on November 18, 1980.191
Whatever the nature and degree of the constitutional infirmity
that resulted from the erroneous engrossments to Committee Sub-
stitute for Senate bill 348, it infected only the resulting legislative
act-chapter 80-257. Nevertheless, when the legislature finally ac-
ted to correct the resulting errors, it did not address chapter 80-
257, but its codified version in chapter 665 of the Florida Statutes.
With the enactment of chapter 81-117, the 1981 legislature simply
amended the various sections of chapter 665 to correct the errors
that had resulted from the erroneous engrossment into Committee
Substitute for Senate bill 348 of Senate amendments 1 through 4
to House amendment 1.19' Chapter 80-257 therefore remained as
susceptible to constitutional attack as before.
Whether this procedure was adequate to assure a viable statu-
tory program for the regulation of savings associations in Florida
depends in part upon the view that one takes concerning the ex-
tent of the constitutional invalidity that infects chapter 80-257 as a
result of these erroneous engrossments. Under the view that only
partial invalidity resulted, and that the remaining portion of the
act is valid and enforceable law, the regulatory scheme is appar-
ently now immune from constitutional attack on that ground. By
the enactment of chapter 81-117, the 1981 legislature inserted in
chapter 665 the exact wording that had been erroneously omitted
and deleted the exact wording that had been erroneously included,
thereby perfectly assuring the completeness of the regulatory
scheme.
Under the view that chapter 80-257 was rendered totally inva-
lid by the erroneous engrossments of the 1980 session, however, the
197. The session met from 2:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on November 18, 1980, for the sole
purpose of enacting legislation granting the Florida Supreme Court authority to expand the
jurisdiction of the statewide grand jury upon petition by the Governor. See FLA. H.R. JouR.,
Sp. Sess. of Nov. 18, 1980; FLA. S. JOUR., Sp. Sess. of Nov. 18, 1980.
198. 1981 Fla. Laws 224, ch. 81-117 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 665.0201(5)(a), (b), (d),
.028(1)(c), (d) (1981)) (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 665.021(5)(a), (b), (d), .028(1)(c) (Supp.
1980)).
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picture is rather more complicated, in that the conclusions to be
drawn must depend partly upon certain obscure and as yet
unadjudicated ramifications of Florida's continuous statutory revi-
sion program.199 An important feature of the program is the bien-
nial adoption of the portions of the Florida Statutes that are being
carried forward from the preceding regular edition of the Florida
Statutes as "the official statute law of the state."200 By way of illus-
tration, this means that the version of chapter 80-257 that was
originally codified in the 1980 Supplement to the Florida Statutes
as chapter 665 was only prima facie evidence of the law,20 1 and
retained that status until it was carried forward into the 1983 edi-
tion, when it was adopted as positive law by the 1983 legislature.02
During the period when chapter 665 was thus only prima facie
evidence of the law, chapter 80-257 constituted the best evidence
of the law. If, therefore, during that period, chapter 80-257 had
been adjudicated totally invalid, chapter 665 of the Florida Stat-
utes would necessarily have fallen with it, and there would have
been no statutory basis for the regulation of savings associations in
Florida. Actually, there was no judicial challenge to the constitu-
tional validity of chapter 80-257 during that period, and chapter
665 was, in fact, enacted into positive law by the 1983
legislature. 03
Since it would be quite inconsistent with this new status as
"the official statute law of the state" for chapter 665 to continue in
such a state of jeopardy, subject to a potential attack on the con-
stitutional validity of the underlying legislative act, the author is of
the firm opinion that chapter 665 is now immune from such attack.
Unfortunately, however, there is no precise judicial precedent that
directly supports this opinion, and there is, moreover, reason to
doubt that the Florida Supreme Court would agree with it.
The Florida Supreme Court has been quite erratic in its prior
adjudications concerning the proposition that adoption of a codifi-
cation as positive law immunizes it against subsequent indirect
constitutional attack through the underlying statute by which the
specific provision was originally enacted. The court has repeatedly
held that such adoption cures title defects under article III, section
199. FLA. STAT. §§ 11.2421-11.2425 (1981).
200. Id. § 11.2421 (1981).
201. Id. §11.242(5)(c) (1981).




6 of the Florida Constitution,04 thereby immunizing the codified
version of the law from attack on this ground. ' A very recent
opinion extended this curative effect to a defect consisting of a vio-
lation of the single subject requirement of article III, section 6.206
Indeed, there are very early cases actually holding that the adop-
tion of the Revised Statutes of 1892 into positive law had the effect
of validating substantive changes in the law that had been initi-
ated by the commissioners who had compiled the code.107
On the other hand, the court, in a poorly reasoned opinion,
once held that such curative effect did not extend to a defect con-
sisting of the failure to republish an amended law, as required by
article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. ' 8 Similarly, in
another recent case, the court rejected, without discussion, the no-
tion that adoption of the Florida Statutes as positive law could
have the effect of reviving provisions of the Florida Statutes that
had previously been repealed by implication.0 9
In view of this past record, it is difficult to anticipate how the
Florida Supreme Court would rule on the proposition that adop-
tion of the Florida Statutes as positive law would cure2 10 a defect
consisting of a material variation in wording between an enrolled
act and the bill as passed by the two houses of the legislature.2 1'
204. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 6: "Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter
properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."
205. Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County, 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1972); McConville v. Ft.
Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931); Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla.
513, 55 So. 273 (1911); Richey v. Town of Indian River Shores, 337 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th DCA
1976), aff'd, 348 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1977).
206. State v. Combs, 388 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1980). For the text of article III, section 6,
see supra note 204.
207. Inman v. Davis, 125 Fla. 298, 169 So. 741 (1936); Mathis v. State, 31 Fla. 291, 12
So. 681 (1893).
208. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 189 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1966). For a
critical analysis of this holding, see Means, Repeals by Implication in Florida: A Case
Study, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 423, 458-59 (1979). FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6 provides: "No law
shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only. Laws to revise or amend shall set
out in full the revised or amended act, section, subsection or paragraph of a subsection."
209. North Am. Mortgage Investors v. Cape San Blas Joint Venture, 378 So. 2d 287
(Fla. 1979).
210. The consequence under discussion has been referred to herein as constituting a
"cure" of a procedural defect in the prior legislative act only because that is the way courts
commonly refer to it. It would be more accurate to say that the constitutional defect in the
original act of the legislature simply becomes irrelevant when the act is superseded by its
codified version at the time the latter is adopted as positive law. Upon such adoption, the
codified version becomes the best evidence of the law. As such, its legitimacy cannot be
made to depend upon the legitimacy of some prior legislative act.
211. The highest court of at least one state has so held. Keaton v. State, 212 Tenn. 690,
372 S.W. 2d 163 (1963).
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This means, then, that the current status of the law by which Flor-
ida savings associations are regulated is infected by a double layer
of confusion. There is confusion resulting from uncertainty as to
the extent of the invalidity that resulted from the erroneous en-
grossments of amendments during the 1980 session. This confusion
is then further compounded by the uncertainty concerning the du-
ration of the period during which the regulatory program will re-
main susceptible to constitutional attack because of the variations
in wording.
Although the likelihood of such an attack now seems remote,
this is confusion that need not be tolerated, for it can be easily
dissipated. All that is required is for the legislature to reenact
chapter 665 of the Florida Statutes as it presently exists. This sim-
ple procedure would terminate for all time the uncertainties result-
ing from the 1980 experience.
